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MANAGEMENT PROFILE AND TRAINING NEEDS FOR 
MARINE RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT 
C.O. Okidi 
ABSTRACT 
The long history of evolution of the Law of the Sea through State 
practice as well as codification and progressive development, culminated 
in the Law of the Sea Convention signed, under auspices of the United 
Nations, at Montego Bay, Jamaica, on 10 December 19 82. One of the prin-
cipal features of the Convention is the area of the Sea which it brings 
under the two legal regimes of the Exclusive Economic Zone and the Conti-
nental Shelf. Under these two regimes considerable areas of the Sea are broght 
under national jurisdiction for purposes of exploration, control, conser-
vation and exploitation of marine natural resources. The regimes also define the 
zones with the highest probability of the attractive natural resources, 
notably fisheries and hydro-carbon. 
It is estimated, for instance that Kenya and Tanzania would each 
acquire a new zone of between 20,000 and 200,000 nautical square miles 
over which they have exclusive jurisdiction and sovereign rights for 
purposes of exploration, exploitation and conservation of natural resources. 
This paper, which focuses only on hydro-carbon, argues that in 
order for the respective coastal states, such as Kenya to benefit in a 
meaningful way, from the natural resources newly brought under its juris-
diction, it must acquire requisite technology and manpower to explore, 
exploit, transport, process and market the hydro-carbon and its other 
products. 
Accordingly, the paper outlines an analytic profile of basic 
and broad management needs. Thereby, it suggests The specific training 
needs required to meet the needs suggested by the management profile. 
In conclusion, the paper suggests some broad frameworks for developing 
manpower to meet these development needs. 
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I INTRODUCTION 
This paper focuses on the imperatives of marine resources 
management^therefore' a proportionally large part of it sets out, 
in a broad way, the activities and operations which constitute the 
management of offshore resources. That outline of activities will 
at once suggest the training and manpower needs required for 
accomplishment of the corresponding management goals. They are, 
however, juxtaposed against a subsequent section which looks at 
the scope of training and research work currently done in Africa 
as an example of the average situation in the developing countries. 
The subsequent part outlines certain schemes of training for the 
management needs • 
All aspects of the management of marine resources have 
evolved at the national level largely as a result of the interaction 
between national economic and social needs, on the one hand, and on 
the other, the development of the expertise and technology for the 
exploitation of such resources. The corpus of international legal 
regime has also changed and evolved correspondingly, trailing after 
the foregoing imperatives. The latest state is the Third United 
Nation Conference on the Law of the Sea which concluded the conven-
tion signed at Montego Bay, Jamaica on December 10, 1982.1 That 
Convention stipulates legal regimes for the various zones of the 
ocean, viz: the territorial sea (Articles 2-32); Contiguous Zone 
(Articles 33-45); Archipelagic States (Articles 46-54); Exclusive 
Economic Zone (Articles 55 to 75); Continental Shelf (Articles 76 to 
55), High Seas (Articles 86 to 115); Islands (Articles 121); Enclosed 
and Semi-Enclosed Seas (Articles 122 and 123); and the Seabed or Area 
beyond national jurisdiction (Articles 133 to 191). There are also 
provisions relating to functional questions such as protection of 
marine environment; scientific research; regional cooperation; 
transfer of technology; and rights of access for land-locked states. 
1. The final document adopted as convention was referenced 
A/CONF.62/122 of 7 October 1982-United Nations Convention on the 
Law of the Sea. 
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Evidently, management profiles for all these subject areas is too 
large for this discussion paper. Therefore, for its purposes the paper 
will confine itself only to management of a specific natural resource 
sector, namely, hydrocarbons which are obtainable from the Continental 
Shelf and the Exclusive Economic Zone. Thus, the purpose is not to 
analyse the legal regime of these marine zones; rather we will directly 
and broadly outline requisites of management of petroleum and oil resources, 
and thereby to suggest the corresponding training needs. 
The Convention referred to above was the end - product of the 
Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea. Although the 
conference was formally convened for its first substantive session in 
Caracas, Venezuela in June 1974 the preparatory work actually started in 
1969, and from then it engaged the attention of member states of the United 
Nations-™^"1 formal and inter-sessional negotiations its conclusion. 
It therefore qualifies for the longest and most protracted negotiation in 
history of multilateral diplomacy. But there are three other explicit and 
implicit aspects of this long negotiation. Firsts it has been an expensive 
undertaking for member states who had to send people on an average of four 
months of negotiation away from their countries every year. Secondly, it 
engage important manpower from these countries. Thirdly, the negotiations 
implicitly suggested that there would be concrete economic benefits 
accruing to the states from marine resources. Therefore, the negotiations 
and the eventual convention raised hopes in the member states that the 
participating states will derive wealth from marine areas especially the 
zones of the sea that are immediately contiquous to the land territory. 
This paper suggests that even if the benefits exist in fact, they 
will not automatically accrue to the States. In fact there is a presuposition 
that the states had commenced the preparation of high - level training of 
manpower to manage the resources of such marine zones and to ensure the 
concrete economic benefits. 
II BACKGROUND 
Early Developments 
Throughout all history nations, particularly coastal communities, 
have utilized certain marine resources for consumptive purposes. In this 
context fisheries and associated resources, such as crab, oysters, pearl 
shell, coral and sponge were so dominant that they formed part of the basis 
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for national jurisdictional assertion recognized'even before the 
2 
emergence of modern concepts of high seas or territorial seas. 
Among the consumptive uses of marine resources, fishing was a principal 
occupation of the coastal communities for two major reasons: Firstly, 
it provided excellent food required for nutrition. Secondly, it was an 
occupation. 
Therefore, essentially fishing met what might be characterized 
as the development needs of that time and over time. It was an activity 
carried out with the simple technology that was obtainable at the time. 
The training for handling of the technology was done by the societies 
that were rather simple in their range of activities. But it was the 
expansion and sophistication of the technology in that historical perspe-
ctive that forced nation states also to consider the extent of their 
national jurisdiction over marine area for fishery purposes. Thus, we 
find that at the turn of the present century an illustration that the 
British Government were still divided within themselves as to how far 
3 
out to sea they should claim jurisdiction over fishing activities. 
But for the society, the youths in the fishing communities gained the 
knowledge of the art as part of their basic socialization. 
In the more recent times the complexity of the societies, 
wrought by industrialization and increasing population led to higher 
demand for resources obtainable from the sea. Concomitantly, there 
was increasing sophistication of the technology for exploitation of 
those resources and this, coupled with industrialization and population 
increase, enhanced the fear that access to the resources should be 
protected by some established territorial claims. Like industrialization, 
the evolution of the technology has favoured certain areas of the world, 
2. Hurst, "Whose is the Bed of the Sea, _sedentary Fisheries 
Outside the Three-Mile Limit" in British Year Book of International Law 
Vol. 4, (1923-24) pp. 34-43. 
3. Mortensen V. Peters in Great Britain, High Court of Justiciary of 
Scotland, 1906 summarized in Briggs, The Law of Nations: Cases Documents 
and Notes (N.Y.: Appleton-Century-Croft, 1952) pp. 52-57. 
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so that industrialized countries are also the technologically more 
advanced and at the same time, have the largest pool of trained 
manpower to further utilize and develop the technology. So the demand 
for the natural resources to feed the industries as well as practices 
in consumption have been more conspicuous and lavish in the same 
countries. 
Ordinarily, economists would have us believe that demand as 
such has a major role in the development of the economy because it will 
provide impetus to the entrepreneurs. But recent trends in the developing 
countries would confirm that demand, which is glaring in those countries 
is hardly enough. The real essentials and prerequisites are expertise 
and technology which must augment entrepreneurship. This combination can, 
in fact, lead to the discovery of new sources of natural resources 
previously unknown, and ways of using such resources to enhance development. 
In the context of development with marine resources the 
dominant role of national expertise in manpower and technology was well 
articulated in the epochal proclamation enunciated by President Harry 
Truman of the United States on 28th September 1945. The proclamation, 
often considered ds the starting point of positive law on the subject of 
jurisdiction over continental shelf and seabed, asserted the jurisdiction 
of the United States over the resources of the continental shelf adjacent 
to that country's coast. What is strikingly important for the present 
discussion is how Truman proclamation expressed the role played by the 
national "competent experts" with "modern technological process /whose7 
utilization is already practicable or will become so at an early date"to 
discover and make available new natural resources such as hydrocarbon and 
other mineral resources from the continental shelf of the U.S. coast, and 
for the development of the U.S. economy. 
Essentially, the latch for the policy decision was a combi-
nation of national expertise and their technological sophistication in 
time perspectives. In fact, over time the two factors changed the landscape 
in the relationship between the coastal state to their marine resources 
as well as between and among coastal states. Thus, several years after 
two of the arms of British Government, the Judiciary and Foreign Office 
(Executive) agreed to resolve the Mortensen V. Peters dispute, partly to 
*+• The text of the proclamation is reprinted in Lay, Churchill 
and Norquist (Eds) New Directions in the Law of the Sea Vol. 1 
(Dobbs Ferry, N.Y. Oceana Publications 1973) pp.- 106-109. 
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avoid Norwegian displeasure, another issue carne. This time it was on 
the criteria for drawing appropriate baseline in the Norwegian coast and 
thus to determine the exten t of their internal, as distinct from inter-
national waters for purposes of control over fishery resources. The 
5 
dispute was the Anglo-Norwegin Fisheries Case decided by the IGJ in 1951. 
That decision only determined the baseline from whence the outer limit 
might measured once the extent of that limit was agreed upon. Recall now 
that the Truman Proclamation did not give the outer limit of their continental 
shelf either. It simply referred to "continental shelf beneath the high 
seas contiguous to the coasts of the United States". 
In fact, upto 1958 when the first United Nations Conference on 
the Law of the Sea adopted, among others, the Convention on the Continental 
Shelf, there was a belief that available technology could exploit only 
certain limited areas "adjacent" to the coast. For that reason Article 1 
of that Convention defined the Continental Shelf to mean (a) " 
the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas adjacent to the coast but 
outside the area of the territorial sea, to a depth of 200 metres or, 
beyond that limit, to where the depth of the superjacent waters admits of 
exploitation of the natural resources of the said area; (b) to the seabed 
and subsoil of similar areas to the coasts of island." 
However, within less than a decade there was a call for 
another United Nations conference on the law of the sea. Initially, the 
main reason was to agree on the outer limit of coastal state jurisdiction 
over the submarine, areas. It was clear that technological sophistication 
and national expertise were so advanced and progress so rapid that man could 
exploit the entire geological continental shelf as well as most of the seabed. 
Immediately, scholarly suggestions were being advanced for ways of revising 
the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf, especially the question 
of outer limit of the continental shelf, since the definition based on 
6 exp loit ability had ceased to have the clear juridical sense. 
5. "Fisheries Case" (United Kingdom v Norway) /1951/ 
ICJ Rep'orts, p. 116. 
6. See for instance, Oda, "Proposals for Revising the Convention on 
the Continental Shelf" in Columbia Journal of Transnational Law Vol. 7 
(1968) pp. 1-31. 
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The trend that had been set by the United States was overtaken 
by the advancemen t of technology and expertise. Recal now that 
an explonatory release appended to the Truman Proclamation had 
specified that the U.S. experts had determined that the claim would 
"make possible the orderly development of an underwater area 750,000 
square miles in exte nt". That area, they pointed out, included 
sub-surface structures associated with oil deposits in the Gulf, off 
the coast of Texas and off the coast of California. The goal was to 
maximize the U.S. national interests, according to the technology of 
the time. 
So some Latin American coastal states on the west, where there 
was no continental shelf to spedk of, decided that they should protect 
their offshore fisheries interests. Because they would not rely on 
the geological and geographical notions of continental shelf they 
sought other criteria which might be a match for the Truman Proclamation. 
This is when Jerman Fisher, a Chilean Lawyer cautious to find a legal 
precedent for whatever their would claim, misread the U.S. President 
F.D. Roosevelt's map contained in security zone Declaration of Panama 
and thought the limit of that zone extended to 200 nautical miles. 
. . So 
Chile became the first country to claim 200 nautical miles coastal 
jurisdiction on June 23, 1947 then followed by other Latin American 
7 
States. Peru, one of the countries which followed suit, has since 
become one of the world's leading fish producers and exporters. 
During that period there have been several confrontations between 
these Latin American countries, including Ecuador, with foreign 
fishing fleets they sought to exclude from the 200 miles zone. 
Whatever was the nature and gravity of the confronations, the fortu-
itious choice of 200 miles zone, to protect coastal marine resources 
became one of the most powerful concepts in history of the law of the 
sea. 
7. See Holick, "The Origins of 200-Mile Offshore Zones" in American 
Journal of International Law vol. 71 (1977) pp. 474-500; Garcia-
Amador, "The Latin American Contribution to the Development of 
International Law of the Sea" American Journal of International Law 
Vol. 68 (1971) p. 33; Okidi, "The Role of the 0AU Member States in 
the Evolution of the Concept of Exclusive Economic Zonein Law of the 
Sea: The Frist Phase" Dalhousie Law Journal Vol. 7 (1982) pp. 39, 
71. 
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Meanwhile, the anxiety over the outer limit of the continental 
shelf persisted. It became increasingly pronounced in the North Sea, 
which was also to be one of the world's largest oil fields. Eventually, 
these led to the disputes between West Germany and the Netherlands, and g 
Denmark decided by the ICJ in 1969. And that was only part of the North 
Sea resource problems. The fishing disputes were only partly settled in 
the 1951 Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case. Iceland with its rich fishing 
grounds ;.ad similar conflicts particularly with British long distance 
fleets, leading to the so-called "Cod War" which were eventually referred 
to the International Courts of Justices and finally resolved by a number 9 
of treaties recognizing the Icelandic claim to 200 miles jurisdiction. In • 
the entire history of the dispute over Icelandic fishing grounds that 
country pleaded for safeguard of its internal economic interests against 
foreign fleets with increasingly refined technology. 
New Challenges in New Areas of National Jurisdiction 
The sophistication of fishing technology and the concomitant 
increase in the demand for more fishery resources led to intensified 
exploitation of fish near coasts of various states and this in turn led 
to widespread, though uncoordinated, decision by coastal states to 
expand their jurisdiction..1 further outwards. The aim was to protect the 
resources in the coastal zones by excluding long-distance fleets. By the 
beginning of the Third U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III) 
in 1974 there was a general unanymity that there be created a zone, sui 
generis, called the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) over which the Coastal 
states would exercise exclusive jurisdiction and sovereign rights for the 
exploration and exploitation of natural resources. Initially, the 
move was to enable* the developing countries to plan, manage and exploit 
8. For a commentary see Jennings, "The limits of Continental Shelf 
Jurisdiction: Some Implications of the North Sea Case Judgement." Inter-
national and Comperative Law Quarterly Vol. 18 (1969) pp. 819-832. 
9. For background, see Iceland and the Law of the Sea: Fisheries 
Jurisdiction in Iceland both from Rey Kjavik: Government of Iceland, 197 2; 
ICJ, Application Institution Instituting Proceedings Filed in the Registry 
of the Court on 14 April, 1972" Fisheries Jurisdiction Case" (United Kingdom 
of Great Britain v Iceland). For the final treaties signed on 28, November 
197 5 - between Iceland and Belgium see International Legal Materials Vol. 
15 (1976) p. 1: Iceland nd West Germany, p. 43. Treaty between Iceland 
and Norway signed on 10 March 1976 and with U.K. on June 1976 are both in 
International Legal Materials Vol. 15 pp. 875 and 878 respectively. 
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the resources of the Zone which, according to Article 57 of the Conven-
tion"1"^  " shall not extend beyond 200 nautical miles from the base-
line from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured." And gene-
rally, the proponents of that concept agree that they now have a juridical 
regime whichjby treaty, gives coastal states enough power to control and 
utilize the natural resources of that coastal zone. Article 56 stipulates, 
in part3 that in the Exclusive Economic Zone, the coastal state has: 
"(a) Sovereign rights for the purposes of exploring and exploit-
ing, conserving and managing the natural resources, 
whether living or non-living, of the sea-bed and subsoil 
and the superjacent waters, and with regard to other 
activities for the economic exploitation and exploration of 
the Zone, such as the production of energy from water, 
currents and wind;" 
The delimitation of the continental shelf, where it extends 
beyond the 200 miles of the Exclusive Economic Zone is alot more complex 
and is outlined in Article 76 of the Convention. But it is certain that 
the 200 nautical miles of the coastal belt, with its natural resources, 
becomes subject to the rights of the coastal states as briefly stated 
above. That limit of the Exclusive Economic Zone alone brings considerable 
area and resources under the sovereign .rights of the coastal state, for 
purposes of exploration, exploitation, conservation and general management. 
In simple terms, the actual area brought under national juris-
diction by the legal regime of the Exclusive Economic Zone is considerable. 
Of course, by virtue of their geographical location the land-locked count-
ries get nothing. But, Table I below shows that even though the developing 
countries might not figure prominently among the top-ten states acquiring 
the largest areas of the seajas in Table Iljthey actually are in fairly 
large numbers among states acquiring over 20,000 square nautical miles 
beyond 200-metre isobath. Certainly the area as such does not guarantee that 
there will be the valuable natural resources; however, it is more emphati-
cally certain that without that area at all the chances of the obtaining 
the resources are correspondingly reduced. 
JO. The Convention ready for signature of states is referenced 
U.N. Doc. A/C0NF.62/122 dated 7th October, 1982. 
Table I 
Areas of Sea-Bed Acquired by States, Byeond the 200-Meter Isobath Through the Extension 
of National Jurisdictional Limits to a Distance 200 Nautical Miles from the Coast 
No Gains 
(50) 
0-5,000SNM 5-10,000SNM 10-12,000SNM 20-200,000SNM Over 200,000SNM 
(10) (4) (6) (53) (24) 
Albania Bulgaria Iran Algeria Kenya Australia 
Bangladesh Dahomey Malta Argentina Korea (North) Brazil 
Cameroon Ethiopia Thailand Barbados Korea (South) Canada 
Congo Guinea Trinidad & Burma Liberia Chile 
Gambia Tobago China, P.R. Libya Ecuador 
Israel Tunisia China, Rep. of Malaysia Fiji 
Lebanon Uruguay Colombia Mauritania Iceland 
Romania Costa Rica Morocco India 
Syria Cuba Nauru Indonesia 
Yugoslavia Cyprus Nicaragua Japan 
Dominican Rep. Nigeria Madagascar 
Republic Oman Maldives 
Egypt Pakistan Mauritius 
El Salvador Panama Mexico 
Equatorial Saudi Arabia New Zealand 
Guinea Senegal Norway 
France Sierra Leone Peru 
Gabon Sri Lanka Philippines 
Ghana Sudan Portugal 
Greece Tanzania Somalia 
Guatemala Tonga South Africa 
Guyana Turkey Spain 
Haiti United Kingdom Soviet Union 
Honduras Venezuela United States 
Ireland Vietnam (South) 
Italy Western Samoa 
Ivory Coast Yemen (Aden) 
Jamaica Yemen (San'a) 
(Land-locked & 
Shelf-locked 
states) 
Source: Ocean Development and International Law Journal, 
Vol. 1, spring, 1973, p.40. 
*SNM - Square Nautical Miles. 
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Table II 
The Outer Edge of the 200 Nautical Miles 
Continental Margin (3,000 metres) from the Coast 
1. Australia United States 
(783,800) (1,676,600) 
2 . New Zealand Australia 
(500,300) (1,381,700) 
3. 
t 
Norway New Zealand 
(433,700) (1,338,700) 
4. Indonesia Japan 
(420,200) (985,900) 
5. Canada Soviet Union 
(393,500) (945,200) 
6. Soviet Union Indonesia 
(317,200) (767 ,700) 
1. United States Mexico 
(317,200) (702,600) 
8. Japan Brazil 
(300,800) (699,900) 
9. Argentina Chile 
(251,900) (659,300) 4 
•0. Mexico Norway 
(214,100) (560,500) 
Ranking Order of states Acquiring the Largest Areas of Seabed 
beyond the 200-meter Isobath through the Adoption of New 
National Jurisdictional Limits. 
Source: Ocean Development and International Law Journal, 
Vol. 1, No. 1, spring, 1973, p. 42. 
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Integration into National Economy. 
Proceeding from this last point, then, one must stress that 
for the respective nations to benefit from the natural resources there 
are two basic requirements. First, the nations must have the manpower and 
expertise to explore for, and to extract natural resources as pointed out 
earlier. That presupposes a significant amount of training in a manner 
that corresponds to the respective natural resources sectors. Secondly, 
any newly acquired wealth from that area of the sea must be planned for 
and managed in a manner that integrates it to the general fabric of national 
economy, so as to realize the implications of the notion of permanent 
sovereigntly over a natural resource, within the meaning of United Nations 
General Assembly Resolution 3016 (XXVII) adopted in December 1972.11 As 
an extension of United Nations General Assembly Resolution 1803 (XVII) 
the 1972 resolution reaffirmed, under paragraph (1). "The rights of states 
to the permanent sovereignty over all their natural resources, on land 
within their national boundaries, as well as those found in the sea-bed 
and subsoil thereof, within their national jurisdiction and in the super-
jacent waters". This provision was clearly drawn up with the legal 
regime for the Exclusive Economic Zone in mind. Certainly, it adds to 
the juridical basis for the integration of the natural resources of that 
zone to the planning and management of national economy. 
Integration of the natural resources of these marine areas 
would entail, inter alia, maintaining the full control over exploration, 
extraction and utilization of the natural resources. It entails the 
control by the specific nation over deployment of the nationals in those 
activities as well as determination of the nature of the technology that 
will be utilized for exploration and extraction of the resources. That 
process must also entail the determination of the system of marketing 
of the products and by-products of the industry. And above all, integ-
ration is complete only if the authorities ensure that the proceeds from 
the sale of the wealth is utilized for national development. Indeed,it 
11. Although the U.N. General Assembly has expressed its views on 
permanent sovereignty over natural resources in a number of resolutions 
the most important and consolidating antecedent resolution on the subject 
is the U.N.G.A. Res. 1803 of 14 December 1960. It was that resolution 
which was elaborated, "recalled" and applied to the present subject of 
marine resources in U.N.G.A.Res. 3016 (XXVII) on Permanent Sovereignty Over 
Natural Resources of Developing Countries adopted in December 1972 by 102 
Votes in favour, None against and 22 obstaintions. See text reprinted in 
International Legal Materials Vol. 12(1973) pp. 226-227. 
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is this package which encampuses the concretization of the notion of 
permanent sovereignty over the natural resources. 
Oil production should actually make vast difference in an 
economy of a country both internally and externally. Generally, it is 
held that the current serious economic problems of developing countries, 
manifested by chronic and heavy.indebtedness and foreign exchange shortage 
started with the so-called oil-crisis of mid-1970's. Thus, it comes as 
stark irony that major oil producers such as Brazil, Mexico and Nigeria 
should be classified as debt ridden alongside with the other poor and 
non-oil producing countries. The hypothesis advanced here is that the 
countries simply pumped out and exported crude oiljlike any other raw 
materials, and paid heavily for processed commodities at a higher per 
capita rate than the prices of their crudes. It is a result of failure 
to industrialize; failure to fully refine the hydrocarbon and to involve 
in petrochemical industries which can have impact on employment and 
other sectors of the economy. In other words»they pumped and exported 
crude oil so wrecklessly that they eventually glutted the market and 
faced the price drops of 1983 which wreaked further problems to their 
economies. 
Training As a- Prerequisite: 
To realize these benefits fully, that is, to ensure national 
control of the natural resources and its integration into the national 
economy, it is imperative that there be fully trained cadre of nationals 
and with requisite technology and experience to execute the management. 
Training is essential to explore for the resources, to extract it, (if 
it exists),to process and market the products. Within the framework of 
"processing", the trained people must be able to perceive the industries 
in the context of national socio-economic activities, thus, to diversify 
the possible industries and, concurrently, integrate with the general 
fibre of national economy. Essentially, this rubric of activities under-
score the necessity for persons with diverse training. But above all, 
they must be committed to long-range and long-term service to the country: 
That can be best obtained only from nationals, rather than foreigners on 
short-term commitments, however, genuine, 
A vicious circle might be perceived here. In order to train 
the complete set of the requisite personnel the country needs to have a 
complete understanding of the complete profile of operations involved in 
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marine resources management for national development. It is also import-
ant that the country understands the investment sectors related to the 
'natural resources of the marine area. That will enhance the chances of 
training experts in the complete canvass of functions. Some of the 
sectors on that terrain of operations and development are outlined below 
as the illustration of part of the management profile for which the train-
ing is required. We argue that a competent and complete training prog-
ramme can only be derived from a clear understanding of the range of 
management operations involved and that an outline of the management pro-
file will at once suggest the training needs. 
Ill - A PROFILE OF OPERATIONS AND DEVELOPMENT 
Management of marine resources entail certain specific opera-
tions as well as development activities. Such operations and activities 
are very diverse, but also depend on the sector under review. They are 
also closely interrelated partly because the ocean environment is an 
ecological unity and partly because the management is expected to integ-
rate the resources of the marine area in question, to the national economy 
and its infrastructure. Therefore, it makes sense for any outline or 
analysis of the operations and development activities to examine all the 
major resource sectors, including, inter alia, petroleum, oil; natural 
gas; fisheries; salts; and water. 
However, giving an outline for the activities associated with 
all these resources is beyond the scope of this discussion paper. Instead 
the' paper shall focus, on petroleum and oil from the Exclusive Economic 
Zone and the Continental shelf. The forms of development activities will 
themselves suggest the corresponding training needs and the latter will 
be examined more broadly in the next section. 
(1) Delimitation of the Area 
The most important action in management is to define the area 
of the task, both functionally and geographically, as the case may be. It 
is pointed out above that the present discussion focuses on petroleum, 
oil and gas. Certainly, for these the Exclusive Economic Zone generally 
and the continental shelf, in particular, are the directly relevant marine 
areas and their precise limits for every coastal state or island should be 
clearly delineated. 
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A comprehensive plan of the management of the coastal marine 
resource requires delimitation of the areas, both of the Exclusive Economic 
Zone and the continental shelf. In the first section of this paper we 
outlined some of the instances of disputes arising from lack of agreement 
as to the limits of the jurisdiction of coastal states over coastal marine 
resources. For two reasons it is important that the actual boundaries 
between states with adjacent or opposite coastlines be determined well 
before exploration for resources is commenced. The first reason is that 
it determines - for the state what area it may operate in, thus it defines 
the task area. And secondly, once resources are discovered states are 
likely to be more difficult in boundary negotiation because at that stage 
their dispositions are influenced by the economically attractive resources. 
As the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea crystalized 
the various provisions for the Convention, now signed, commentators dis-
cussed the complex juridical considerations regarding delimitation of. the 
coastal zone in an attempt to prevent some of those difficulties at the 
12 
time of management. That juridical consideration is only a small part 
of the task; a major part involves actual hydrographic and geographic 
implementation of the juridical stipulations. 
The task of delimitation in management becomes particularly 
complex where the mineral resource demposits traverse the boundaries of 
the continental shelf or the Exclusive Economic Zone of given states. 
Under this category could be listed the hydrothermal brines under the 
13 
central rift of the Red Sea. Shortly after the resources were established 
to exist in commercially viable quantities the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 
issued a decree asserting "ownership" over all the hydrocarbon minerals 
and all other minerals existing in the seabed adjacent to its continental 
14 
shelf. That Decree did not take into account the fact that Ethiopia 
Sudan and, possibly, Egypt might also have legally tenable interests 
in the same resources. At the same time the accumulation of the hot 
brines is understood to be increasing steadily. And this also requires a 
12. See, for instance, Adede, "Toward the Formulation of the Rule of 
Delimitation of Sea Boundaries Between States with Adjacent or Opposite 
Coasts," in Virginia Journal of International Law, Vol. 19 (Winter 1979) 
pp 207-255 and Blecher, "Equitable Delimitation of Continental Shelf," in 
American Journal of International Law, Vol. 73 (1979) pp. 60-08. 
13. See Ross, "Red Sea Hot Brines Area: Revisited," in Science Vol, 
175 (March 1972). 
14. Decree No. M-27 dated 7 September 1380 Hegira, (September 7, 1960) 
reprinted in International Legal Materials Vol. 8 (1969) p. 606. 
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clear determination of .the quantity, rate and direction of accumulation. 
Then the respective rights of the littoral states can be assessed and 
understood according to the mutually agreed limits of national jurisdic-
tion . 
It is certainly easier to resolve the matter if the delimit-
ation of the.respective boundaries are determined at an early date. This 
urgency is particularly partinent for the liquid minerals than for hard 
minerals because with the former case the state or concessionaire which 
undertakes exploration and exploitation first might obtain all or most 
of the resources. Some commentators are already examining the juridical 
15 
implications and that ought to be treated with much seriousness. But 
ultimately, every case will present unique problems and characteristics 
and must therefore receive careful and sustained attention of highly 
qualified persons. 
(2) Hydrocarbon as a Sector 
Among the resources of the Exclusive Economic Zone fisheries 
would traditionally be considered as supremely important, partly, because 
of the place it has histocially occupied in commerce. However, this is 
no longer so. Hydrocarbon has assumed a special salience in recent times 
partly because of the role of energy in the industrializing economies as 
well as in transport and partly because,; since so-called "Energy Crisis" 
in 1973, petroleum and oil have also become a tool for political pressure 
among nations. Thus, for a combination of both reasons, every state that 
discovers commercially exploitable quantities of hydrocarbon in areas of 
its jurisdiction assumes a privileged position among nations. Primarily 
for this reason every country would like to strike that quantity of oil in 
areas of its jurisdiction, including marine areas. Accordingly, most 
countries have made some efforts to that effect. Somehow, for various 
geological reasons every country with marine coastline hopes that with 
15. Lagoni, "Oil and Gas Deposits Across National 'Frontiers," in 
American Journal-of International Law Vol. 73 (1979) pp, 215-243. 
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some effort, hydrocarbon can be discovered in the continental shelf or 
beyond that."^ And once hydrocarbon is discovered, a series of operations 
and activities follow, to ensure that oil is extracted from the ground, 
processed and sold. Every stage should contribute to national develop-
ment . 
A detailed outline of the :tasks and activities related to the 
search for and extraction of hydrocarbon generally or from marine areas 
. 1 7 
is a complex one, well beyond the competence of this paper. The most 
we can undertake here is to give the broad themes involved with brief 
explanatory notes and that will suggest the corresponding needs for train-
ing to meet the national objectives. 
At that broad level one can suggest that a complete range of 
operations that can facilitate integration of the offshore hydrocarbon 
into the national economy will involve the following five operations. 
a) Exploration 
b) Production 
c) Transportation 
d) Processing 
e) Distribution and Marketing 
These operations are interrelated and often complementary, with varying 
sequences. For instances, transportation comes before and after process-
ing. At the same time, there may be instances where processing is 
omitted altogether. Below, are only brief expository comments on the 
management profile. 
a) Exploration: 
This is the general search for petroleum deposits. Essentially 
it entails use of seismic, geophysical and magnetic techniques of obtain-
ing data and interpreting the information in order to make inferences as 
given geological formation, A number of methods, .including to the probability of the existance of petroleum deposits m a/computerized 
18 techniques, have been deployed in the interpretation of the geophysical data. 
16. Because marine petroleum deposits are generally associated with the 
sedimentary formations of the continental shelf it is often assumed that there 
would be no such deposits in the sea-bed areas. However, for a summary of the 
technical feasibility of such deposits see the views of an eminent authority 
K.O. Emery, "Potential for Deep Ocean Petroleum".Ambio Special Report No. 6 
(1979) pp. 87-92. 
17. See a lucid and brief outline of the technical tasks by H.D. Smith, 
"The Problems of Hydrocarbon Extraction" in Maritime Policy and Management Vol. 
4, (1977) pp. 351-376. 
18. ibid, p 358. 
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There are three broad points one ,can emphasize at once. First, 
that the operations require very highly trained professionals, in every 
aspect of the operations. It is not sufficient to have, for instance, one 
geophysicist in the country. There has to be a teamwork. Second, the 
technology involved in this process is high sophisticated and it is not 
likely that the technology used in exploration on land will be applicable 
to the marine conditions. The physical operating conditions will be quite 
different. And obviously, this set of technology will correspond to the 
available manpower to obtain any results. Third, exploration for oil is 
an expensive enterprise because it does not promise any immediate revenue 
to the exchequer, who would set aside the exploration funds. Perhaps it 
is for this reason Emery found that 95 per cent of the world's offshore 
oil and gas has been found by marine private companies from half-dozen 
19 
industrialized western nations. This point can be further underscored 
by the experience from Kenya Where nine private oil companies or consortia 
spent a total of about K£13.2 million on exploration for oil on land 
territory between 1970 and 1977, and that does not include K£53,234 paid 20 
to the government for prospecting licences. The tragedy m this example 
is that a verdict of "dry well" was returned for all twenty test holes 
drilled. 
A corresponding task conducted in the marine environment would 
be more expensive and'risky. The cost component'is'again tied to the 
kinds of technology required for marine environment. Every aspect of 
the design and operation of the technology such as pipelines and their 
accessories are time-consuming and delicate matters. 
Exploration for hydrocarbon may therefore entail two perspec-
tives. One is'a directly purposive approach such as by oil companies 
which, with or without any existing data but by inferences from indirect 
geological or geophysical information, set out to look for oil. The other 
one is through general scientific research with a view to gather data for 
purposes of national planning. The latter operation is often undertaken 
by national institutes of oceanographic or earth sciences. The exercise 
may actually find hydrocarbon deposits or it may obtain data useful for sub-
sequent determination of the potential existance and quantities of hydro-
carbon. In any event, the data collected by such national research 
19. Emergy, op.cit. p. 87 
20. Okidi, "History of the Search for Oil in Kenya" (University of 
Nairobi, IDS (mimeo) October 1979) p. 12-13. 
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institutions become national assets which may be contributed to the 
negotiation for the purposive exploration contract with private companies. 
b) Production 
After it is ascertained that commercially viable quantities 
of hydrocarbon exists in a given area preparations are made for its 
extraction or production. One of the most valuable commodities will have 
been found and in an environment singularly most risky and delicate. At 
times, the location of the find or possible well are remote from land 
and therefore, presenting difficult operating conditions. Thus, needless-to-
say, the highest sophistication in expertise and technology is an 
imperative and this must be accompanied by exemplary caution in decision-
making on fiscal matters and the choice of applicable technologies and 
their economies. 
The complex engineering operations include fabrication, install-
ation and emplacement of the off-shore equipments, including drilling 
21 
rigs, platforms and pipeline-laying. H.D. Smith suggests that platform 
mstallation is doubtlessly one of the most spectacular offshore operations. 
There are concrete platforms already in use; in case of steel platforms 
computer-controlled methods of tilting the platform have now been 
developed to enhance precision. Careful considerations go into other 
generations of technologies to include also the decision on the number 
of platforms to be deployed in order to enhance economies. 
The aim of all that complex operation is to ensure that the oil 
is drilled and brought to the surface safely and ready for safe transport 
to the processing plants, wherever that might be. Safety is emphasized 
here for two reasons. First, for reasons of economy, namely, that oil being 
as valuable as it is in the market, and having involved the complex 
and costly technology, should not be lost or wasted. If through careless-
ness or mishap the oil gets out of control and drains into water it is 
lost. Secondly, that loss of oil might mean an ecological disaster as was 
22 demonstrated in the Santa Barbara Channel disaster of January-April 1969 
23 
or the Chevron Oil Company's well at Venice, Louisiana in March 1970. 
These incidents also demonstrated how difficult it is to cap the wells 
21. Smith, op.cit. p. 3 59 
22. See New York Times, Jan 31 and April 3, 1969. 
23. New York Times, March 2, 1970. 
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once a blow-out occurs and this is an eventuality for which any offshore 
oil production must have complete contingency plans. Both the waste of 
oil in such a disaster and the ecological consequences have adverse 
impact on the national development goals in that oil in water will destroy 
fish, kill birds and prevent use of beaches for recreation and amenities. 
This point calls to mind the fact that before the offshore 
oil production is commenced there should be a comprehensive plan to 
balance out the contending uses of the areas involved. As pointed out 
earlier, fisheries have as important a role as oil (if not more so) and 
the management of offshore oil production should take it into account. 
There are other uses of the ocean space for which planning must be wholly 
completed and possible conflicts are reconciled. Such a range of 
activities are illustrated in Figure 1 below. An intimate knowledge of 
the area involved and the engineering aspects of these operation is a 
prerequisite to the rational planning of the long-range operation for 
assured long-term benefit to the coastal state. In essence, this is part 
of the field of "Coastal Zone Management," taught in several United 
States Universities, especially under Sea Grant Program. 
Offshore operation in exploration and production of hydrocar-
bon has largely been the preserve of the pre-existing private oil com-
panies. Smith points out that such has been the case in the North Sea 
24 
here the majority of the companies are of American origin. So here 
also is the relevance of the estimate by Emery that private oil companies 
from a half-dozen industrialized western countries are involved in 95 per 25 
cent of the world's offshore oil and gas. This applies to nearly all 
the hydrocarbon production in the developing countries. But the extent 
to which individual states might resent the trend is perhaps illustrated 
by the situation in Canada where the nationalistic position on their 
economy led to the establishment of the public oil corporation- (Petro-
Canada), and its decision to go into oil operations. In 1981 Petro-
Canada bought up all interests of a Belgiun oil company, Petrofina, in 
Canada; by 1983 it had bought up the marketing infrastructure of Shell-BP 
in Canada. The important point in this trend was that after acquisition 
of Petrofina in Canada some oil oompanies feared that their own interests 
were not secure. For instance, Mobiloil Company which had discovered 
24. Smith, op.cit. p. 351 
25. Emery, op .cit. p. 87 
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Hibernia fields off Newfoundland became reluctant to expand their oper-
ations or to openly reveal their actual exploration data arguing that 
they were not sure that they would eventually fall to the fate of 
Petrofina. 
Perhaps the net implication of this position is that any oil com-
pany which has the sole custody of the data from exploration may in fact 
withhold that information from the national authorities if in their view 
the national polity is not unequivocally hospitable to foreign investors. 
On the other handsthe national safeguard is not to swear oath of allegi-
ance to the foreign investors but to ensure that national experts actually 
involved enough to have access and custody to that information as it gets 
generated. 
We might add here, parenthetically, that Petro-Canada Inter-
national has also been established as the international corporation with 
the purpose of actually assist developing countries develop their own 
capabilities in the oil fields, including in exploration and production. 
c) Transportat ion 
There are two basic options for transportit ion of the oil. One 
is to pipe it to shore; another is to load it on tankers at sea. While 
both modes may in fact be used simultaneously especially during the early 
27 
stages of production, large fields are often developed by offshore load-
ing. In any eventthe mode of transportation would be influenced by the 
choice of location of processing. It is convenient to pipe the crudes 
directly to an onshore refinery in the country itself while, it is con-
venient to-load into the tanks if it is for processing abroad. In such 
cases off-shore loading terminals would be constructed and deployed. 
Once ashore the oil may be sent directly to markets abroad by 
tankers or long-range piping. Or it may be piped and fed to the refine-
ries in the same country for processing. 
Lest it be overlooked, let us point out that transportation is 
the most perversive attribute in the management of offshore oil production. 
26. Observation on the Canadian scene based on discussions with 
officials of Petro-Canada and Mobil Oil Company in Canada in 1981, 
especially at St. John's in August 1981. 
27. Smith, op.cit. p. 359 
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Transportation of extracted oil, as mentioned above is only one require-
ments for equipments to be used in the production operations offshore. 
This aspect will be further mentioned under the general theme of other 
support services below. Meanwhile, let us complete the vertical line 
relating to the oil itself and look at processing as the next step, after 
transportation. 
d) Processing 
The operations encampused under the rubric of processing in-
clude every aspect of cracking of crude oil and gas products into their 
usable component parts. Certain aspects of the operation actually 
commence in the offshore setting such as the separation and liquefaction 
or flaring of gas contained in crude oil to stabilize the oil and in 
order to avoid explosion risks, before it is transported. The scale of 
this operation depends on the quantities involved; in certain instances 
the separation may be done ashore. 
But an important point to note here is that like most of the 
offshore operations, this activity involves highly sophisticated tech-
nology and entails deployment of very limited but highly trained manpower. 
That is to say, this aspect of management of oil industry is not one that 
will generate much employment to the country involved. In actual fact, 
the oil companies are likely to recruit their labour force from a 
variety of places where they have worked before, such as in the Gulf 
of Mexico, North Sea and North-western Atlantic. 
Once the petroleum, oil and gas are brought ashore in form of 
crudes there is a whole complex of processing activities that are required 
In most cases developing countries export their oil in form of crude. 
Nigeria, the largest oil producer in Africa (Nigeria and Libya contend, 
for this top slot) was known to get a large revenue from sale of its so-
called "sweet", sulphur — free crude most of which is exported to the 
United States, European Economic Community countries, Japan, Eastern 
Europe and Africa, in that order. 
This tendency, where it persists, means that oil production is 
really not integrated into the national economy. The national setting 
functions as a warehouse of raw materials for industrialization in other 
countries. This is the role which the developing countries have played 
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in the past: "raw materials warehouse". And that is, by and large, 
where the scope of their management of the petroleum and oil resources 
from the Exclusive Economic Zone or continental shelf was often ended. 
Where this stage has been exceeded in developing countries 
there is often only nominal refineries largely for domestic fuel consump-
tion. The rest of the economy relies on the export of crudes for revenue. 
But the tragedy with the general euphoria associated with revenue from 
crude is that it may lead to a general neglect of other economic sector. 
Very often the victim is the agricultural sector. The combination of 
warehouse syndrome and neglect of agricultural sector has been manifested 
rather forcefully in the case of Nigeria. The country was formally 
declared a major oil producer in 1973 when it joined OPEC and from then, 
crude oil exports contributed over 80 per cent of its overall foreign 
exchange earning. Arthur Nwankwo, Nigerian commentator, points out that 
concurrently Nigerians abandoned agricultural sector where previously 
palm produce and cocoa alone bad contributed 70 - 80 percent of the count-
2 8 
ries foreign exchange earnings. And worse, domestic staples, such as 
rice and beans, previously produced locally were from then imported. 
The heavy emphasis once placed on the production of cassava, rice, millet, 
yam and beans as export crops practically vanished. 
Nwankwo points out further, that before Nigeria established 
its first refinery to cater for domestic gasoline consumption the country 
exported crude oil to the western countries which after refinery (value-
added) it reexported it and Nigeria bought the fuel at a high cost. Thus, 
"foreign exchange earned from exports of crude oil was virtually swallowed 
29 
by importation of gasoline." He adds, in the same lines that when the 
first refinery commenced production in 1965 it had a capacity of 3 2,000 
barrels per day, limited to producing only petrol, diesel oil and kerosene. 
But because it was not constructed for production of lubricants, aviation 
fuel, bitumen, among other by-products of crude oil these were still 
imported at substantial foreign exchange cost. 
The important point in this scenerio is that agricultural 
sector had been abandoned and food imported at exhorbitant costs. Instead 
of agricultural occupation the population took to peddling of a wide 
28. Nwankwo, Arthur A. After Oil, What Next? Oil and Multinationals 
in Nigeria (Enugu, Nigeria: Fourth Dimension Publishers, 1982) p. 11 
29. ibid p.14. 
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variety of consumer goods ranging from simple domestic hardware to major 
electronic equipments, some of which were re-exported to neighbouring 
countries. 
Recent efforts to reverse this trend range from closure of 
borders; war against indiscipline (WAI), to a determination that Nigeria 
must actually establish its own full-scale petrochemical industries, It 
has been pointed out that offshore operations are not a major source of 
employment. Apart from the fact that most of the operations are highly 
capital intensive the oil companies are likely to bring along with them 
old hands who have worked in offshore operations elsewhere, such as Gulf 
of Mexico, North Sea or northeastern shores of North America or even 
Prudhoe Bay. Least of all are they likely to take on the regularly un-
skilled workers engaged in agriculture. For these reasons it is arguable 
that if petroleum discovery is to assist in diversification of the 
economy generally,and employment in particular, then the country must plan 
and undertake petrochemical industries. 
In the case of Nigeria two industries expected to commence 
operation in 1985 are: at Kaduna, to produce Linear Akyl Benzene and at 
30 
Ekpan (Bendel State) to produce polypropylene and carbon black. The 
reports add that a second phase of industries are now slated for Rivers, 
and possibly Imo> States. 
The industrial concerns expected to benefit from such petro-
chemical plants include packaging, building construction, housewares, 
furniture, automobiles, textiles, rubber products, fertilizers and in-
sect ic ides. 
Obviously industries such as fertilizers and insecticides would 
have direct and positive impacts on agriculture„ Besides, if the full 
gamut of refinery was done including cracking the remains after petrol, 
diesel oil and kerosene,the other products such as bitumen would have 
further advantages for the economy, such as in road construction. But 
that list suggests the kinds of economic spin-offs that might ensuer from 
petrochemical industries as opposed to simply exporting crude oils. 
30. The Guardian (Lagos) June 17, 1984 pp. 1 and 12 and Nigerian 
Statesman (Lagos) June 18, 1984 pp. 1 and 9. 
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Nigerians estimate that the Rivers project alone, as presently conceived 
31 
would generate some 45,000 jobs. It is perhaps a relevant coincidence 
that aduring the same time the new Government decided that all the major 
government consultancy contracts must be given to the national universities 
and polytechnics, unless they agree that the nature of the projects re-3 2 quire external collaboration. 
Those who plan the management of offshore petroleum and oil 
must reorient the perception of the developing countries from dependence 
on cottage/village technology. These countries must involve in manage-
ment of the advanced technology for diverse productivity using their 
natural resources. Most of that offshore oil has actually not been dis-
covered yet; in some cases the exploration is yet to be started. In 
most cases exploration is underway. There are specific instances where 
actual proven reserves have been found and production under way, such as 
the case of Nigeria, Cameroon, Gabon and Angola. There are others, such 
as Mozambique where prospects are fairly good and serious prospecting and 
production agreements have been negotiated. Yet there are instances such 
as Kenya where exploration though seemingly serious, have not yielded any 
actually positive results. The majority of African countries are in the 
latter category. This is the stage at which management planners have to 
embark on programmes of training and creating awareness, as will be dis-
cussed again later. The intention should be to enhance self reliance for 
developing countries to the extent possible, through diversified economic 
activities and effective control of the natural resources. Diverse and 
exhaustive processing of resources can be effected, for instance, by 
creating vertical and horizontal integration of the petroleum and petro-
chemical and oil industries at different stages. Concomitantly there 
would be established linkages which ensure the integration of such 
industries into the fabric of national economy. 
e) Distribution and Marketing 
In view of the foregoing discussions we would include the dis-
tribution and marketing of petroleum, oil, gas and petrochemical products 
of all kinds. It is important to note that the petroleum and oil market 
31. 
32. 
The Guardian loc. cit. 
The Guardian (Lagos) June 18, 1984 pp. 1 and 2. 
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has become particularly complex, to correspond with the economic and 
security value of the commodity. It would be upto the experts in the 
field to determine the extent of domestic and export markets and to feed 
information back to the production process. 
3. Governments Decision - Making and Fiscal Aspects of Management 
The extent to which a country can benefit from off-shore oil 
resources depends largely on the governments® mastery of the fiscal regime 
related to the full range of the operations. Thus, there must be a 
clearly aligned governmental structure to deal with such work programmes. 
Very often the work is left to be handled entirely by the ministry res-
ponsible for petroleum or energy without involvement of the Treasury even 
when most of the initial investment in exploration and production had 
been issued by the exchaquer. But even if such an investment outlay was 
not made in the ordinary sense, the exchequer is the custodian of national 
wealth. The resources are vital to the country as a source of revenue and 
as a national heritage, and the State is expected to perform its inherent 
duty of exercise of permanent sovereighnty over natural resource by ensur-
ing the full realization of the full benefits accruing- from such natural 
resources. 
i . i ' 
Nearly each of the government's ministries should have cadres 
of people to deal with the all-pervasive question of offshore hydrocarbon 
resources from its exploration to marketing as an interdisciplinary 
matter. One can see immediately that several ministries, such as treasury, 
planning, energy, transport, labour, education, legal affairs, natural 
resources, tourism, physical planning, and industry, would be involved. 
The key fiscal questions involved are licensing of exploration; 
production taxation; export taxation; industrial incentives; and the use 
to which the revenue it to be put. Above all these is the legislation 
and protocols for regulation of the basic offshore industrial operations. 
There would also be labour policy and health to deal with deployment of 
nationals and non-nationals in the operations as well as the stipulations 
on working environment of the people in the full range of the industry. 
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4. Other Support Services 
There are several support services which are part of, or in-
extricably linked to the management petroleum and oil sector in marine 
activities. But for purposes of this discussion paper we shall outline 
only three broad areas as follows: 
a) Transportation Services 
b) Research and Information Services 
c) Operational and Development Services 
a) Transportation Services 
Ports and harbours as basic .infrastructures are required for 
two sets of functions related to offshore oil and gas development. First 
it is the epicentre for haulage of the equipments to be used in offshore 
operations, ranging from rigs and platforms to the smaller units. Thus, 
the room required for berthing will, of necessity4 be vast. Second, ports 
and harbours will be required for ships and tankers to move the crude 
or refined oil to the refineries or markets. Some of the carriers will 
be the so-called Very Large Cargo Carriers (VLCC's) which will require 
particularly deep harbours. The latter category might, in fact, require 
also the construction of offshore terminals. 
; • . i. / 
But the fact of the matter .is that to support offshore operations 
for oil and gas consideration of space and safety in the ports and harbours 
is particularly important. In most cases there will be a need to: vastly 
expand the facilities to create the required space. At the same time there 
must be carried out detailed hydrographic surveys of the harbours and 
their approaches to ensure the required depth and clearance in the inte-
rest of safe navigation. 
# 
Most national ports are inadequate for conventional trade 
activities, not to speak of the offshore oil and gas activities. A whole 
new infrastructure with its corresponding management staff will be nece-
ssary for the offshore operation. This is one of the points that readily 
hits one on a visit to St. Johns, Newfoundland where people are rather 
excited about the great "Hibernia" fields. At present ports and harbour 
facilities are woefully inadequate and discussions with the officials of 
the Ports Authority suggest that the level of awareness of the infrastruc-
ture which would support such operations is still lacking. One might 
28 _ 
IDS/WP 415 
suspect that unless there is a very urgent change in Newfoundland the only 
way the operation will go on is if the operations use offshore platforms 
and ship crudes directly to overseas markets. In which case, they will 
have provided yet another warehouse for crude oil to fuel industrializ-
ation elsewhere, 
b) Research and Information Services. 
Advancement of the knowledge of the marine resources, and the 
ocean area generally, depend on research and information services. Res-
earch may fall into two related categories. First, the nation will under-
take research with a view to compile knowledge of the oceanic data, dynamics 
and resource profiles. This requires ships, laboratories, equipments 
and, above all, manpower, for the work to be done on a continuing basis. 
"New Scientific knowledge is built upon existing knowledge, and success-
ful research calls as much for access to scientific literature and data 
, 33 
to ships and laboratories/' This category of research may lead immedi-
ately to discovery of mineral resources, as was the finding of the hydro-
thermal . br ines in the Red Sea or it may simply provide basic data. 
The second category is the notion of research with resource exploration 
specifically in mind. As pointed out by Emery in a statement quoted 
earlier, private oil companies from western countries have been dominant 
in this field and in several places they have found oil. Whether or not 
they reveal their oil finds depends entirely on them as the information 
might be their industrial secret unless there are nationals of the 
territorial state,competent experts,with a practical access to the inform-
ation. The information from such research should be properly considered 
part of the wealth of the country within whose jurisdiction it is collected. 
In sum, research itself is a conditio sine qua non of marine « 
resources management as well as part of management. And to have control 
over the findings and timing of exploitation of the resources the 
national institution must have a direct control over the research of both 
categories. That determination to have national control over the data 
is a political decision but whether or not it can be realized depends on 
the range and depth of expertise available to the nation. 
33. IOC, Marine Science and Ocean Services for Development: A comp-
rehensive Plan for Major Assistance Programme to Enhance the Marine Science 
Capabilities of Developing Countries (Action Paper of the 15th Session of 
the IOC Executive Council 1-6 March 198 2) IOC/EC - XV Annex 5 Rev. Paris. 
15 Dec. 1981. p. 11. 
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To support the national research institution and experts there 
must be a complete and competent information service in marine affairs. 
This will require information experts, complete with system for synthesis, 
storage, retrieval and dissemination of information. 
c) Operational and Development Services 
As an area of recent offshore operations, North-East Scotland 
coastal areas display a wide range of establishments supporting offshore 
operations. A visit to that area, from Aberdeen, through Peterhead, 
Fraserburgh to Inverness, finds a wide range of companies which specialize 
34 
in support services for offshore operations in the North Sea. There are 
a number of industries fabricating and producing the equipments utilized 
in the offshore operations. On the other hand, there are industries 
whose speciality is to service those equipments by way of maintenance, 
survaillance and efficiency control. Other aspects of the industries 
relate to storage services. 
A special category of services may specialize in emergency 
combat as in the capping of blow outs or tanker rescue services. 
Above all, the offshore operations involve human beings working 
in an unusual environment with its unique stresses. Therefore, a unique 
range of medical services is required. Besides, for the same reasons 
that human beings are involved there will be a necessity for special 
skills in land use planning to rationalize settlement and to expand social 
catering services as education and housing. Several other economic 
activities will automatically follow and therefore employment planning is 
a crucial management question. Planning for these purposes require 
persons with unique training including comparative perspectives. 
IV - STATUS OF MANPOWER AND TRAINING IN AFRICA 
The discussion of operations related to marine resources deve- , 
lopment up to this point will have, at once, suggested the range of ex-
pertise and manpower needs required for a country to receive the benefits 
34. For a discussion of the case of Norway see Wood "Norway Regional 
Impacts of offshore Hydrocarbon" (Dalhousie University, Institute of Public 
Affairs Dec. 1980: mimeo.) 
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from the resources. Therefore, it is not necessary to list the areas of 
training needed. It implies that the country must strive to train high 
level manpower in geological and. geophysical prospecting; drilling; off-
shore production and reservoir engineering; application of various forms 
of combustion engines to petroleum production; petroleum economics and 
related fiscal regimes, petroleum technicians; and lawyers. It is not 
easy to be self-sufficient in these fields but a state should of necessity 
strive for the best representation. In any event, it must always be 
borne in mind that technology in these areas is in fast development. 
Therefore capacity to maintain continuous briefing is indispensible and 
the nation should encourage its nationals to continue education and 
experience anywhere. Nigeria was able to call on several of its. nationals 
working abroad in. various fields related to petroleum production, even 
if it didnot completely industrialize. African countries could only 
seriously rely on the most committed nationals for the full range of 
hydrocarbon related expertise. It is now instructive to glance at the 
African situation just to point out that the developing countries in 
Africa .have an awfully long way to go. That situation is certainly true 
of most of developing countries in Asia and Latin America where the 
exceptions among coastal States would include Brazil, Argentina, India 
and Indonesia. 
One gets an immediate expose of the African scene by glancing 
at the report of the UNESCO/ECA survey mission to African coastal States 
35 
done in 1980. On the side of teaching or training there has been very 
little or no programmes to develop high level professional manpower in 
the marine sciences. In the natural sciences the main focus has been 
undergraduate teaching producing holders of B.Sc. degrees or equivalents 
in Biology Chemistry, Physics, Geology and Mathematics. Programmes lead-
ing upto Ph.D. degrees in marine sciences are non-existent in the conti-
nent . 
A few people holding advanced degrees in the basic fields like 
botany, chemistry, zoology, Geology and Physics have often doubled as 
experts in marine sciences basically because the subject area is in vogue 
and there are no bona fide experts in the field. When involved in policy 
35. UNESCO/ECA, Marine Science and Technology in Africa: Present 
State and Future Development (Paris: UNESCO Reports in Marine Science 
No. 14, 1981, Project RAF/78/024. 
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matters in such areas such people may. in fact, perpetuate mediocrity 
and superficiality and therefore lack of professional seriousness. In-
dividuals holding advanced or Ph.D. degrees specifically in marine affairs 
are actually very few in the continent and non-existent in most count-
ries. Since training programmes in those fields are scanty the number 
will remain low, unless some concerted efforts are commenced to correct 
that situation. 
Of those who have that advanced training directly in marine 
affairs the majority are likely to be in marine biology and fisheries. 
That tendency might perhaps feed into itself, A recent Workshop on 
Marine Technology lamented of the UNESCO/EGA reports that it did not 
Include off-chore exploration and exploitation of oil and gas which 
36 
would be of interest to Nigeria, Cameroon and Angola at present". 
Apparently, the organisers held that only countries which already have 
proven off-shore hydrocarbons should be interested in the subject area. 
This is certainly a mistaken notion since nat Lonals of the respective 
countries should in fact have been involved in the exploration process. 
There are usually a few geologi ts in the government, with 
some knowledge of jj-arroleui.. operation. But ii. most of the cases the 
training is incomplete and, in any event, the person, since graduation, 
has been pushing papers and attending meetings; he is overworked, frust-
rated and worse9 without access to reading materials on the subject area. 
After a while , the-, person can claim profession, only by name, not by 
substance. 
On research, it is sufficient to quote a sentence from the 
UNESCO/ECA report which observed that: "Research which is the main life-
blood of scientific training on which tie production of research 
scientists depends are either completely atsent, as in some of the younger 
universities,or still .in a fledging state, as in the majority of the 
37 
universities."J As mentioned above for teaching that report concludes 
on the same page that only a few of the African universities at present 
have any teaching and research programmes in marine sciences, and even 
then the main emphasis on research so far is in biology and fishery 
sciences. 
36. Interactional Cooy-ratlon in Marine Technology., Science and 
Fisheries; The_Future U.S. Role in Development: Proceedings of a Work-
shop Jar-ary 18-22, 19*81 (La Jolla, Cal. : Scripps Institute of Oceano-
graphy. Washington, E.G., rational Academy Press 1981). p. 35 
37• Supra note p. 12 
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Where there is no manpower and expertise development it can 
be expected that institutional infrastructure will not evolve either. 
There will be no research vessels, equipments and laboratories. And the 
vicious circle will continue. For development to occur the bottleneck 
must be broken somewhere. Most of the discussions have urged for trans-
fer of technology as a means of breaking the bottleneck. In fact, that 
broad package is often misleading in that the technology might break the 
bottleneck only if in the fore-front is placed the training of high-level 
manpower and expertise in the respective fields. 
In that case the trained manpower would choose, receive 
the technology or they may, in fact, be able through skilled engineering 
techniques, to modify or rationalize the technology to suit it to their 
own circumstances or to adhere to parsimony. This is why there is no 
limit to the training needed for the developing countries. A working 
group at the Scripp's Workshop considered that there were "some graduate 
students from developing countries studying in the United States and 
38 
conducting research unrelated to the needs or their own countries". In 
a general context this view suggests that there is some "village 
technology" beyond which developing countries should not go. This is a 
total misconception. Professionals train to be nothing but complete 
professionals in the fields of their preparation and they should strive 
to achieve excellence and nothing less. It is only when an engineer has 
the full knowledge of technology in a given field that he/she can choose 
what to use, what to fabricate for a given situation or how to rationalize 
or modify existing technology to suit a given situation. The implication 
of the submission at the Scripps Workshop is that the so-called developing 
countries should only train to be simple technic5.ans, who depend on the 
engineers from the presently industrialized countries eternally. 
If developing countries are to realize the full benefits of the 
marine resources in the Exclusive Economic Zone and continental shelf 
then they must train their own people and their aim must be persuit of 
excellence at every level. That is to say., not every one must be trained 
to Ph.D. level (or beyond, in terms of excellence in research), but at 
whatever level one is trained the goal must be universal. 
38. Supra note 35 at p. 34 
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V. SOME SCHEMES FOR TRAINING 
Two points are important here by way of preface. First, the 
interpretation of the notion of transfer' of technology adopted above is 
the governing principle for the design of the scheme for training of 
manager in marine resources development. What they gain in the course 
is part of the technology for management of the resources; at the same 
time the individuals are prepared to receive any technology software and 
hardware that may reach the country.. The training must be as to prepare 
the individuals to receive, adopt and diffuse the technology. 
Second, the training is a purposive exercise. The design of 
a training scheme should entail a prior careful examination of the range 
of management and operational activities as discussed in Part III above. 
Thereafter, every subject in the course should be targetted at specific 
sectors ranging from exploration to the government's fiscal policies and 
other decision-making matters. 
The training itself may fall under two broad categories: Short 
courses and Long training. These can take different forms and durations 
but here only brief outlines can be sketched. 
a) Short Courses 
i 
These could be designed for management cadre in place. Ini-
tially they could be packaged as inter- and multi- disciplinary and 
general orientational in character. The purpose might be to build up 
the notion of comprehensiveness and interrelated nature of marine re-
sources management. But that should not exclude also opportunities for 
individuals to pursue a modicum of in-depth projects in areas of 
specific interests or formal training. 
In that event, the basic professional background of the parti-
cipants would not matter. They could be drawn from public administra-
tion, engineering, economics, geology, biology, law, chemistry, among 
others. 
The duration would depend on a number of factors; the level 
of managers and their responsibilities at home base is often a leading 
consideration. But it has been found in experience that if a government 
- 9M- -
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is determined on the training needs then they will be more concerned 
about the perceived quality of the training programme than the duration. 
In any event, for an intensive short course any duration upto ten weeks 
nay be reasonable provided that it is packaged to be cost-effective in 
terms of use of time and resources. 
The specific merits may be considered for holding the courses 
nationally, regionally or globally. Perhaps the regional approach would 
yield optimum benefits in terms of distance; sharing of resources and 
experience and follow up possibilities. But there are also instances 
where the global approach has its advantages. 
Content of the short courses may also be varied. Apart from 
the comprehensive design of the multidisciplinary and interdisciplinary, 
there can also be designed the short courses for specific subject areas 
to enhance efficiency in the respective sector. These would also vary in 
duration depending on the scope of its coverage, 
b) Long Training Schemes 
This may be called the professional training programmes to 
produce high level manpower and expertise for high level research and 
development. The fields would include, inter alia, oceanography, geologi-
cal and geophysical prospecting, hydrography; resource economists; 
geophysicists; petrologists; off-shore production and reservoir engineer-
ing; petroleum economists; industrial chemists; and resource lawyers 
and planners. These studies should be pursued to doctoral and post-
doctoral level. What is important to note is that such training takes a 
long time. In point of fact, the developing countries, with only a few 
exceptions, are very late in commencing the training scheme. This means, 
in effect, that most of the search for and production of oil in the off-
shore areas of these countries will be done entirely by foreign commer-
cial interests in countries where nearly no one at all can monitor or 
regulate the operations. No one expects the oil to make meaningful con-
tribution to national development under those circumstances. 
Even though the training should have commenced several decades 
ago it is not too late yet. National governments can still embark on 
concerted training programmes provided that they can secure the requisite 
35 -
financial assistance. It is also true that because of the costly nature 
of the training only a few can be trained in each country at a time. It 
is therefore a decidedly long-term undertaking which does not threaten 
to saturate any country with highly qualified but idle engineers. 
Finally, the technology in these areas is fast in flux. It 
requires constant followup and updating. Therefore, such expertise as 
are so trained must have opportunities to update their knowledge con-
stantly. 
